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PRECAP; State v. Eskew: “This is just like on TV” – Evaluating a 
Real-Life Miranda Warning 
 
Hannah Wilson 
 
I.   QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
  (1) Did police officers’ downplaying of their Miranda warning 
render Ms. Eskew’s resulting waiver involuntary?  
(2) Did the totality of the interrogation circumstances, including 
officers’ misrepresentations, psychological pressure, and guilt assumption 
techniques, render Ms. Eskew’s confession involuntary?  
(3) Did the District Court err in precluding educational expert 
testimony regarding false confessions?1 
 
II.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is 
“whether the suspect’s will was overborne by the circumstances 
surrounding the giving of the confession.”2 The Montana Supreme Court 
has held that “the use of the guilt assumption technique, without more, 
does not constitute such physical or psychological coercion, deception, 
threats, or promises sufficient to tip the totality of the circumstances test 
in [the defendant’s] favor.”3 This case balances these competing interests 
through the appeal of Jasmine Eskew, which raises three issues concerning 
the constitutionality of forced confessions. The outcome of this case will 
provide a more conclusive framework for determining the point at which 
a confession becomes voluntary as well as addressing the issue of expert 
testimony regarding false confessions.  
 
III.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Appellant Jasmine Eskew called 911 on September 18, 2012 to 
report her daughter Brooklynn was unresponsive and having trouble 
breathing.4 Eskew stated that Brooklynn started “screaming and shaking,” 
and that she proceeded to rock Brooklynn to calm her down.5 Medical 
                                           
1 Brief of Appellant at 1, State v. Eskew, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2014-
0445%20Appellant's%20Opening%20--%20Brief?id={F0061154-0000-C616-BF3B-
BE03A2E42E2E} (Mont. April 13, 2016) (No. DA 14-0445). 
2 Id. at 18; State v. Morrisey, 214 P.3d 708, 719 (Mont. 2009) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000)).  
3 State v. Jones, 142 P.3d 851, 856 (Mont. 2006). 
4 Brief of Appellee at 1-2, State v. Eskew, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2014-
0445%20Appellee's%20Response%20--%20Brief?id={F071E756-0000-C52F-87DC-
4AC3804F81DD} (Mont. Sept. 1, 2016) (No. DA 14-0445). 
5 Id. at 6. 
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personnel at the hospital in Great Falls ultimately determined that 
Brooklyn had a traumatic skull injury, likely caused by child abuse, 
because “children of that age cannot cause brain injuries on their own and 
Eskew did not indicate that Brooklynn had suffered a traumatic accident.”6 
Medical staff reported this to Detective Scott of the Great Falls Police 
Department, and a nurse practitioner also shared that it appeared to him 
that Brooklynn had been shaken shortly after her arrival at the hospital.7 
Brooklyn was transported to Spokane for additional medical care where 
she was declared brain dead within a few days.8 CT scan and MRI results 
indicated that Brooklynn’s injury was actually consistent with 
“nonaccidental head trauma,” rather than shaking.9 
Meanwhile, two and a half hours after the 911 call, while 
Brooklynn underwent medical examination, Eskew was questioned in a 
police interrogation room.10 The officers assured her that her statement 
would be passed on to the doctors to assist them at the hospital and that 
Miranda warnings were merely a formality “anytime that you’re talking 
with detectives in the police station.”11 She subsequently waived her 
rights, and the officers explained that Brooklynn’s injuries were not 
consistent with Eskew’s story and suggested that Eskew was “rougher than 
she had described when she was rocking Brooklynn.”12 Eskew agreed that 
she was the only person that could have caused Brooklynn’s injuries and 
that she was present when the injuries occurred.13 The officers claimed that 
they knew that she had been shaking Brooklynn, and insisted that she agree 
that she had misrepresented her attempts to console Brooklynn by 
“rocking” and “bouncing” her.14 They instructed her to “stop lying to 
them.”15 They “eventually became frustrated” that Eskew’s account was 
inconsistent with Brooklynn’s injuries.16  
Ultimately, “the interrogation resulted in Eskew stating that ‘I did 
shake her’ and demonstrating forceful shaking.”17 Eskew was held in the 
interview room at the police department from 6:56 PM until 10:43 PM, 
when she was arrested and charged with assault on a minor and deliberate 
homicide.18 
A jury convicted Eskew of assault on her infant daughter 
Brooklynn, but acquitted her of deliberate homicide.19 Eskew wanted to 
                                           
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 3–4. 
8 Id. at 3. 
9 Id. at 3–4. 
10 Id. at 4. 
11 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4. 
12 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 6–7 
13 Id. at 7. 
14 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 5; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 8. 
15 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 7. 
16 Id. at 7 
17 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 5. 
18 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 9; Id. at 1. 
19 Id. at 1. 
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suppress her admission of shaking because she claimed that the police 
interrogation was aggressive, the officers failed to provide a meaningful 
Miranda warning, and the totality of the circumstances rendered her 
admission (and physical demonstration of shaking a police-provided doll) 
involuntary.20 Additionally, the defense was prohibited from presenting 
expert testimony to educate the jury about the counterintuitive effects of 
false confessions, which Eskew argues would have explained that similar 
police interrogation techniques correlate with “innocent people confessing 
to crimes they did not commit.”21 Eskew appeals her conviction for assault 
on a minor, challenging the District Court’s denial of her motion to 
suppress her pretrial statements and the exclusion of expert testimony on 
false confessions.22 
 
IV.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.   Appellant Jasmine Eskew 
 
1.   Eskew’s Miranda Waiver Was Involuntary 
 
Eskew claims first and foremost that her waiver of her Miranda 
rights was involuntary.23 Eskew argues that the officers presented her 
Miranda warning as a mere formality; that they were “questioning her only 
for medical, diagnostic purposes”24 and the Miranda form was simply a 
routine, “just like on TV.”25 They assured her that their reason for 
questioning was for medical purposes to pass along information to the 
doctors.26 The District Court found this to be a misrepresentation because 
the true purpose of the interrogation was a criminal investigation.27  
Eskew argues that the Miranda warning was constitutionally 
insufficient and therefore “the burden is on the State to prove the 
sufficiency of the Miranda warning and the voluntariness of any 
waiver.”28 The officers sought to “check off the requirement” of informing 
the suspect of their Miranda rights while minimizing Eskew’s chance of 
actually invoking them.29 Eskew argues that there is a reasonable 
possibility that “the tainted evidence might have contributed to the 
conviction,” a high bar that the State cannot meet.30 Eskew further 
contends that the standard for determining whether there has been 
                                           
20 Id.  
21 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 6. 
22 Appellee’s Response at 1. 
23 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 9. 
24 Id. at 7. 
25 Id. at 11. 
26 Id. at 12. 
27 Id. at 12. 
28 Id. at 10. 
29 Id. at 12. 
30 Id. at 13. 
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voluntary Miranda waiver cannot be distilled to simply whether the 
officers “contradicted” the Miranda warnings.31 Even if the Miranda 
warnings were read word-for-word, if the warnings were downplayed to 
the extent that they become “mere lip service” a waiver can still be 
involuntary.32   
 
2.   Eskew’s Confession Was Involuntary 
 
The test for voluntariness requires an examination of the totality 
of all of the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors.33 Eskew also 
argues that considering the totality of the circumstances, the statements 
she made and her physical demonstration of shaking the police doll during 
the interrogation amounted to an involuntary confession.34 She contends 
that the officers interviewing her preyed on her distressed state, employed 
psychological pressure tactics, and misrepresented the reasons for the 
interview.35 Eskew asserts that it is the State’s burden to prove the 
voluntariness of a confession36 and that an involuntary confession is 
“inadmissible for any purpose.”37  
Additionally, Eskew argues that the officers used coercive 
interrogation techniques, including the Reid interrogation technique (also 
called the guilt association technique), which presumed her guilt.38 The 
interrogation was premised in such a way that the she “could not 
effectively deny that the incident occurred.”39 Eskew was 21 years old, had 
no prior criminal history, her interrogation lasted nearly four hours, and 
she was in a state of distress because her baby was still unconscious at the 
hospital.40 At the time of the interrogation, Eskew claims that the police 
officers believed that Brooklynn had been hospitalized as a result of 
shaking (though the subsequent autopsy would reveal her injuries to be 
attributable to a single blow to the head)41 and produced a confession from 
Eskew aligned with their mistaken belief.42  
 
                                           
31 Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, State v. Eskew, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2014-
0445%20Appellant%20Reply%20--%20Brief?id={00B72957-0000-C439-87C3-4698D21E61C9} 
(Mont. Sept. 14, 2016) (No. DA 14-0445). 
32 Id.; see State v. Grimestad, 598 P.2d 198, 203 (Mont. 1979). 
33 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 18; Morrisey, 214 P.3d at 717. 
34 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 17. 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 Mont. Code. Ann § 46–13–301 (2015). 
37 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 17–18 (citing Morrisey, 214 P.3d at 719; Mont. Code Ann. § 
46–13–301(4)). 
38 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 19. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 2. 
42 Id. at 20. 
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3.   The District Court Erred in Excluding Eskew’s Expert from 
Testifying 
 
Finally, Eskew argues that the exclusion of her expert testimony 
about false confessions was error.43 Because her expert was excluded, 
Eskew claims she was denied necessary evidence to rebut the State’s 
intuitive argument to the jury that “it is unreasonable to believe that an 
innocent person would confess to hurting her own child.”44 The District 
Court held that the study of false confessions is “novel,” while Eskew 
argues that it has long been a topic of research and the subject of expert 
testimony in court.45 Eskew explains that her expert need only (and does) 
satisfy the two prongs of Rule 702: that (1) the subject matter is one that 
requires expert testimony; and (2) that the expert has either special training 
or education and has adequate knowledge on which to base an opinion.46 
Furthermore, even if the study of false confessions is novel, 
Eskew argues the expert’s testimony met the “helpful, not definitive” test 
used to assess the reliability of novel scientific evidence under Daubert.47 
The Daubert factors laid out by the United States Supreme Court include: 
 
 (a) whether the theory/technique can be 
and has been tested; (b) whether the 
theory/technique has been subjected to 
peer review/publication; (c) whether the 
theory/technique has a known/potential 
rate of error and whether there are 
standards controlling the technique’s 
operation; and (d) whether the 
theory/technique has been generally 
accepted or rejected in the particular 
scientific field.48 
 
Eskew argues that the expert testimony would be helpful to a jury, 
therefore “false confession testimony is sufficiently reliable to satisfy a 
Daubert analysis.49 Eskew argues further that Rule 403 does not bar her 
expert’s testimony because a court favors the admissibility of relevant 
evidence, and the expert testimony would not “invade the jury’s role in 
determining witness credibility.”50 Eskew points to studies about false 
                                           
43 Id. at 25. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 Id. at 28. 
46 Id. at 32; State v. Southern, 980 P.2d 3, 14 (Mont. 1999). 
47 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 35; Hulse v. State, Dep’t of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 961 
P.2d 75, 91 (Mont. 1998); Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).  
48 Id. at 35; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
49 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 35. 
50 Id. at 38. 
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confessions, which are not “so unreliable to warrant judicial exclusion.”51 
Under the relevant standard, even “shaky” expert testimony should be 
admitted for the jury to examine.52 Therefore, the expert testimony Eskew 
sought to present was relevant and valuable and should have been admitted 
as evidence in the District Court.53  
 
B.   Appellee State of Montana 
 
1.   Eskew Knowingly and Voluntarily Waived Her Miranda Rights. 
 
The State maintains that the district court’s findings that Eskew 
received adequate Miranda warnings and that her statements were 
voluntary are not erroneous.54 Eskew fully read her Miranda rights, and 
the video recording of the interrogation depicted her pausing to review her 
rights before signing the waiver.55 Additionally, it argues that statements 
by the officers prior to the signing of the waiver did not negate the 
constitutionality of the waiver because they did not contradict Miranda 
warning language or “indicate that Eskew would not face criminal liability 
if she had harmed Brooklynn.”56  
According to the State, even if the pre-Miranda statements about 
the reasons for conducting the interview could be characterized as 
misleading, they did not undermine the warning itself.57 The State argues 
that the “downplaying the Miranda warnings, by itself” does not render 
the Miranda readings constitutionally insufficient.58 The State argues the 
warnings were not minimized by the officers and Eskew “made a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of her Miranda rights and elected to 
submit herself to the interview.”59 
 
2.   Eskew’s Confession Was Voluntary. 
 
The State contends that Eskew received a timely and complete 
Miranda warning; therefore her confession was voluntary.60 A confession 
is not necessarily involuntary when officers make false statements to the 
suspect if the false statement is not about the existence of incriminating 
                                           
51 Id. at 8. 
52 Id. at 9. 
53 Id. at 32. 
54 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 18. 
55 Id. at 21. 
56 Id. at 22. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 24; State v. Old-Horn, 328 P.3d 638 (Mont. 2014), State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951, 955 (Mont. 
1995), Grimestad, 598 P.2d at 200–02. 
59 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 25. 
60 Id. at 26 (citing State v. Reavley, 79 P.3d 270, 298 (Mont. 2003)). 
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evidence.61 The facts/record/video footage show[s] that Eskew was 
educated, employed, and a competent adult.62 Although she was sobbing 
at the beginning of the interrogation she was “progressively more 
composed as the interview proceeded.”63 The interrogation lasted four 
hours, and considering the totality of the circumstances, the District Court 
found that it was was “not unduly or unfairly coercive, deceptive, or 
manipulative.”64 Additionally, the State argues it is possible to find that a 
defendant’s statements may still be voluntary even when the guilt 
assumption technique is used during interrogation.65 Ultimately, the State 
argues that Eskew simply would not have confessed to a crime she did not 
commit, even if the guilt assumption technique was employed.66 
 
3.   The District Court Properly Excluded the Defense’s Expert 
Testimony 
 
False confession testimony is a novel area of testimony because it 
is controversial and is “not consistently admitted in other jurisdictions.”67 
The State counters Eskew’s argument, stating the “amount of time the 
technique or theory has been used in the scientific community” does not 
provide a definitive standard for whether the testimony is novel or not.68 
The testimony was therefore not admissible under Daubert, and its 
probative value was limited because the jurors, who had viewed the video 
recording of the interview, had all of the information they needed to 
determine whether the interrogation was coercive.69 The introduction of 
the testimony is tethered to the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion 
of the issues.70  
Furthermore, the State argues that Eskew’s expert “failed to 
provide evidentiary support for his theory that the Reid interrogation 
method leads to false confessions and acknowledged there was no way to 
know how often that occurs.”71 The State cites the District Court’s 
conclusion that there was “no theory or methodology that could be tested 
regarding the link between interrogation methods and false confessions.”72 
Accordingly, the expert’s theory and opinion on the issue of false 
confessions would be  unreliable and therefore inadmissible.73 Finally, 
                                           
61 Id. at 27 (citing Reavley, 79 P.3d at 298). 
62 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 27.  
63 Id. at 27. 
64 Id. at 28. 
65 Id. at 30; Jones, 142 P.3d at 858. 
66 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 29. 
67 Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 7. 
68 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 35. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 20. 
71 Id. at 38. 
72 Id. at 36. 
73 Id. 
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even if the District Court erred in excluding the expert testimony, the State 
argues the error was harmless because the District Court adequately 
instructed the jury that false confessions do occur and the expert’s 
testimony cannot reasonably have been the reason that Eskew was 
convicted.74 
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
 
Eskew’s allegedly involuntary Miranda waiver is a threshold 
question for the court. If Eskew can prove that she involuntarily waived 
her Miranda rights, she would be able to prove that her subsequent 
confession was similarly involuntary. The issues are axiomatically 
connected. If Eskew’s waiver of her Miranda rights was found to be 
involuntary, it should follow that her subsequent confession would be 
inadmissible and should have been excluded at the district court. The 
Court’s determination ought to begin with the voluntariness of Eskew’s 
Miranda waiver, because the outcome of that particular issue would put to 
rest the question of whether her confession itself was voluntary.  
Eskew argues she was repeatedly instructed to tell her story in the 
officers’ words by parroting their terms and mimicking their movements; 
attempts to deviate from their proscribed conduct, Eskew argues, were 
classified as lies.75 Montana has a low bar for determining voluntariness. 
Any “psychological pressure exerted upon a defendant to procure a 
confession renders the confession involuntary.”76 Eskew further alleges 
that she felt pressured to agree to the officer’s assertions that she had 
shaken Brooklynn through direct instructions to demonstrate making a 
police dummy doll’s head rock back and forth.77 The officers explicitly 
assumed her guilt and accused her of being a sociopath who faked her 
tears.78 The officers produced a statement that was consistent with their 
belief that Brooklynn had been shaken, though in reality no shaking 
injuries actually existed.79 Essentially the confession obtained was a 
confession to an injury that did not occur, according to the medical 
professionals treating Brooklynn.80 This raises questions about the 
trustworthiness and reliability of the confession. If the Court is willing to 
construe the Hermes voluntariness analysis liberally, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding Eskew’s interrogation could easily be 
interpreted as “psychological pressure,” which could explain an 
inconsistent confession. 
 
                                           
74 Id. at 41–42 
75 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
76 State v. Hermes, 904 P.2d 587, at 588 (Mont. 1999). 
77 Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 8. 
78 Id. at 23. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 12; Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4. 
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The Reid guilt assumption technique, though still permissible in the 
federal system, has been outlawed in Montana as an “impermissible police 
practice.”81 Eskew points out specifically: “this Court has condemned the 
guilt assumption technique of interrogation as coercive.”82 If the Court 
finds that the police officers were using the guilt assumption technique (as 
the District Court did),83 it would diminish the State’s argument that the 
confession was voluntary. However, as the State points out, a confession 
is not involuntary simply because it was consistent with a mistaken 
predisposition—this is not the test for voluntariness. Regardless, there is a 
strong precedent of a broad definition of “involuntary” confessions in 
Montana and the Court will likely feel pressure to acquiesce to its prior 
Miranda case holdings84 in order to protect Montanans from coercive 
interrogation situations. 
It is possible the Court could side with the State, finding that 
Eskew’s progressively stable emotional state throughout the four-hour 
interrogation is evidence of her capacity to knowingly and voluntarily 
consent to be interviewed. She eventually became more calm, “composed, 
articulate, and affirmatively explanatory” when answering questions, 
arguably with the wherewithal to realize that what she said “can and will 
be used against her” “just like on TV.”85 
Eskew sought to introduce expert testimony which was essentially 
a commentary on the interrogation techniques employed by the police 
officers.86 Eskew argues simply describing the oppressive interrogation 
techniques imposed on her was insufficient; there needed to be critical, 
educational expert allowing the jurors to make an informed decision about 
the voluntariness of the confession.87 Though the jury has a video 
recording of the interrogation and should feel free to make their own 
judgments and interpretations of the interrogation, the expert would have 
provided more context for the interview. Whether this injection of context 
around interrogation techniques would have resulted in substantial 
probative value for the jury (rather than the jury reminder presented at the 
district court that sometimes false confessions occur) would be a valuable 
question to ask during the oral argument. Trial courts are given broad 
discretion on evidentiary issues, and the Court is unlikely to overrule a 
trial court.88 
Unfortunately, there was little discussion by the parties about the 
constitutionality and policy rationales behind preventing coerced 
                                           
81 Hermes, 904 P.2d at 589. 
82 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 18–19 (citing Hermes, 904 P.2d at 589). 
83 Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 12. 
84 Id. 
85 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 11; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 12. 
86 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 24. 
87 Id. at 10. 
88 State ex rel. Sparling v. Hitsman, 44 P.2d 747, 749 (Mont. 1935) (citing Kain, 20 P.2d 1057, 1059 
(Mont. 1933)). 
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confessions. The outcome of this case will have significant implications 
on Montana’s interpretation of due process in criminal interrogation 
situations, because the Court is continually seeking to balance the search 
for truth and justice against the assurance of voluntary and willing 
confessions.  
If the Court affirms the District Court, it moves in the direction of 
applying the literal words of the Miranda warning by finding that any 
mischaracterizations did not undermine Eskew’s Miranda rights. 
If the Court, however, sides with Eskew, this case may be the 
death-knell for the Reid technique and would add greater protection for 
police suspects within the context of Miranda. If Eskew gets a new trial 
with her confession suppressed, this case could require police practices 
throughout the state to undergo substantial training in administering 
effective Miranda warnings. There will be fear of “downplaying” the 
warnings and more care will be taken in presenting the warnings to 
suspects. This might require more administrative effort, but because 
voluntary confessions are deemed to have a higher degree of reliability 
and trustworthiness, they are integral to the Fifth Amendment right not to 
incriminate oneself.89 There should not be too many risks associated with 
making real-life Miranda warnings a little bit more serious than they are 
presented on TV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
89 Hermes, 904 P.2d at 588. 
